I've been thinking recently about the possible fruitfulness of comparing cleverly-disguised-mule-worries (CDMW) in epistemology with Kripkensteinian-meaning-underdetermination-worries (KMUW).
I think it is helpful, in understanding CDMW, to think about two kinds of questions:
(1) Why does S believe those animals are zebras rather than lions?
(2) Why does S believe those animals are zebras rather than cleverly disguised mules?
'Because they are zebras' looks like a good answer to questions like (1) and a bad answer to questions like (2).
For a contextualist explanationist about knowledge like myself, this suggests that in contexts where the question 'Is S's belief explained by the fact believed?' amounts to something like (1), 'S knows they are zebras' looks good, and in contexts where that question amounts to something like (2), 'S knows they are zebras' looks bad.
What I find suggestive, in trying to understand KMUW, is an analogy with the questions:
(1') Why does S use 'plus' for addition rather than subtraction?
(2') Why does S 'plus' for addition rather than quaddition?
'Because of the dubbing, or otherwise word-defining, activities of S's linguistic predecessors' looks like a good answer to questions like (1') and a bad answer to questions like (2').
More on this topic will follow ...
Thursday, February 28, 2008
Tuesday, February 26, 2008
Michigan
It's now settled that I will be spending September to December as a Visiting Associate Professor in the excellent Philosophy department at the University of Michigan, Ann Arbor.
Daniel will be there too as a Visiting Professor.
It's very exciting to look forward to hanging out with an fantastic bunch of philosophers, including my erstwhile Canberra colleague, Andy Egan.
Daniel will be there too as a Visiting Professor.
It's very exciting to look forward to hanging out with an fantastic bunch of philosophers, including my erstwhile Canberra colleague, Andy Egan.
Friday, February 22, 2008
New Web Pages, V-day Podcast
Following a small web crisis in the department, I have made myself a new set of web pages using Google Pages. This was fun; while the editor itself is very basic (but also therefore very easy), and doesn't allow you to do much, a workaround when you want to get other kinds of content or formatting into your page is to make another page and then cut and paste (from the page not the html) into the Google Page Editor. This seems to have worked for everything I've needed so far.
In other news, the Nottingham University Podcasts folks recently made a Valentine's day podcast on my work in the Philosophy of Flirting.
In other news, the Nottingham University Podcasts folks recently made a Valentine's day podcast on my work in the Philosophy of Flirting.
Sunday, February 17, 2008
Geneva
For the last few days I've been attending the Eidos Because Conference. And for the few days before that I was attending the Eidos pro*doc Graduate Workshop. All in I've given 6.75 hours of talks during the last six days and participated in 19 further sessions. This has been a real marathon. Some photos are available which illustrate some of the effects.
Highlights have included Kit Fine arguing that vagueness is a kind of collective phenomenon like unevenness, then using this idea to motivate a logic where things of the form ~[(Pv~P)&(Qv~Q)] are true but everything of the form (Pv~P) is true; and David Liggins laying into the idea that standard (maximalist, necessitarian) truthmaker theory can be motivated by thinking that truth requires metaphysical explanation.
Highlights have included Kit Fine arguing that vagueness is a kind of collective phenomenon like unevenness, then using this idea to motivate a logic where things of the form ~[(Pv~P)&(Qv~Q)] are true but everything of the form (Pv~P) is true; and David Liggins laying into the idea that standard (maximalist, necessitarian) truthmaker theory can be motivated by thinking that truth requires metaphysical explanation.
Wednesday, January 30, 2008
We've Set a Date ...
August 2008 is when it's all set to happen. (I'm talking about my book here obviously.)
Grounding Concepts even has its own OUP page now, with instructions on how you can pre-order your copy (for a very reasonable £35).
Grounding Concepts even has its own OUP page now, with instructions on how you can pre-order your copy (for a very reasonable £35).
Thursday, January 17, 2008
Finite Quantities in Arizona
My favourite session at the recent Arizona Ontology Conference was on Daniel's paper Finite Quantities.
Daniel argues that there is suggestive evidence from science to the effect that certain fundamental quantities are quantized rather than continuous. That, for Daniel, is to say that not all properties of the form having n units of X are instantiated, for certain fundamental X such as mass, charge or perhaps distance. Rather, for these X, there is some minimal n such that the property having n units of X is instantiated, and for all other instantiated properties of this form, 'n' is replaced with some multiple of this minimum.
It is commendable to get clear about what the quantized hypothesis looks like, and Daniel gets quite a lot clearer about it than most other discussions I know of.
However, having clarified that it is not a claim about the necessity (nomic, metaphysical or otherwise) of this restriction on the instantiation of certain properties, or about the non-existence, unreality or other substandardness of such properties (assuming that properties can exist uninstantiated), the view does not seem so very surprising or controversial.
It strikes me as a much more modest and palatable claim than the claims that quantizers - including Daniel - often sound like they are making. It sounds considerably less shocking, for instance, than the claim that 'there is no such thing as' (say) 1/2 n units of mass, or that although I may express things like "1/2 n units of mass" in language there is 'no quantity corresponding to these representations' and that 'these quantities are not physically real' (p. 2).
Moreover, clarity as to the exact nature of the quantizer's thesis seems to make some of Daniel's argumentative moves puzzling.
One of Daniel's main opponents in the paper is someone who says that every time (say) a mass of six units is instantiated, the thing which instantiates the property having six units of mass also instantiates having three units of mass (twice over) and having two units of mass (three times over).
But let's be clear about two readings of 'having three units of mass'. On the first, it means 'having at least three units of mass'. On the second, it means 'having exactly three units of mass (and no more)'.
Now no-one would deny that everything which instantiates having six units of mass also instantiates having at least three units of mass. That would be silly. The quantizer, in this (made up) case, must instead be looking at denying that the property of having exactly three units of mass (and no more) is instantiated by anything.
But once we are clear that this is what is meant, the opponent's position looks silly. Obviously something which instantiates having six units of mass does not instantiate having exactly three units of mass (and no more).
On neither reading, then, does it seem as if a Daniel-style quantizer and the opponent he describes in his paper have a sensible dispute such that they might need to look at the science to resolve it.
Daniel argues that there is suggestive evidence from science to the effect that certain fundamental quantities are quantized rather than continuous. That, for Daniel, is to say that not all properties of the form having n units of X are instantiated, for certain fundamental X such as mass, charge or perhaps distance. Rather, for these X, there is some minimal n such that the property having n units of X is instantiated, and for all other instantiated properties of this form, 'n' is replaced with some multiple of this minimum.
It is commendable to get clear about what the quantized hypothesis looks like, and Daniel gets quite a lot clearer about it than most other discussions I know of.
However, having clarified that it is not a claim about the necessity (nomic, metaphysical or otherwise) of this restriction on the instantiation of certain properties, or about the non-existence, unreality or other substandardness of such properties (assuming that properties can exist uninstantiated), the view does not seem so very surprising or controversial.
It strikes me as a much more modest and palatable claim than the claims that quantizers - including Daniel - often sound like they are making. It sounds considerably less shocking, for instance, than the claim that 'there is no such thing as' (say) 1/2 n units of mass, or that although I may express things like "1/2 n units of mass" in language there is 'no quantity corresponding to these representations' and that 'these quantities are not physically real' (p. 2).
Moreover, clarity as to the exact nature of the quantizer's thesis seems to make some of Daniel's argumentative moves puzzling.
One of Daniel's main opponents in the paper is someone who says that every time (say) a mass of six units is instantiated, the thing which instantiates the property having six units of mass also instantiates having three units of mass (twice over) and having two units of mass (three times over).
But let's be clear about two readings of 'having three units of mass'. On the first, it means 'having at least three units of mass'. On the second, it means 'having exactly three units of mass (and no more)'.
Now no-one would deny that everything which instantiates having six units of mass also instantiates having at least three units of mass. That would be silly. The quantizer, in this (made up) case, must instead be looking at denying that the property of having exactly three units of mass (and no more) is instantiated by anything.
But once we are clear that this is what is meant, the opponent's position looks silly. Obviously something which instantiates having six units of mass does not instantiate having exactly three units of mass (and no more).
On neither reading, then, does it seem as if a Daniel-style quantizer and the opponent he describes in his paper have a sensible dispute such that they might need to look at the science to resolve it.
Saturday, January 12, 2008
Arizona
This post comes to you from the Arizona desert, where I'm currently attending the Arizona Ontology Conference. There have been some interesting sessions about which I'll post soon, but for now, here are some photos.
Wednesday, December 12, 2007
Tim Gowers's Blog
I just stumbled upon this blog by Tim Gowers, a mathematician at Cambridge with interests in the philosophical side of things. It's been running since September, and there are some interesting posts up here, as well as some interesting comments by interesting people. If you're a philosopher interested in maths, and haven't seen it yet, I can recommend a peek.
Explanation Book Proposal
I've just finished and sent off the book proposal for my planned book Explanation in Philosophical Theories. The book will assess the prospects of what might be called 'explanationism' in various areas of philosophy, especially metaphysics and metaphilosophy. Comments welcome, of course.
Monday, December 10, 2007
Backwards Explanation
UPDATE: A little sibling for Backwards E! Our paper 'Liar-like Paradox and Object-Language Features' is now forthcoming in American Philosophical Quarterly. It argues that you can get Liar-like paradoxes without much at all in the object language (in particular, without anything like a truth-predicate, reference to truth-bearers, or negation) so it's a mistake to suppose that these sorts of object-language features are to blame, or that you're safe as long as you ban them. We'll get a final draft online soon ...
Daniel and Carrie are pleased to announce the forthcoming arrival of their first joint project, a healthy 7000-word metaphysics paper which they have named Backwards Explanation.
Backwards Explanation is still in incubation, and will not be fully developed until its appearance in a special issue of Philosophical Studies containing papers from this year's enjoyable and fertile BSPC.
Carrie and Daniel are doing well, and hoping that 'Backwards E', as it is affectionately known, will soon have lots of little brothers and sisters to play with. Following the delivery Carrie will have an Erdős number of 6.
Daniel and Carrie are pleased to announce the forthcoming arrival of their first joint project, a healthy 7000-word metaphysics paper which they have named Backwards Explanation.
Backwards Explanation is still in incubation, and will not be fully developed until its appearance in a special issue of Philosophical Studies containing papers from this year's enjoyable and fertile BSPC.
Carrie and Daniel are doing well, and hoping that 'Backwards E', as it is affectionately known, will soon have lots of little brothers and sisters to play with. Following the delivery Carrie will have an Erdős number of 6.
Sunday, December 02, 2007
Paranormality Again
UPDATE II: I've just heard that this reply will be appearing in Analysis after Caret and Cotnoir's piece (which I believe is scheduled for the July 2008 issue).
UPDATE: I've now drafted a more thorough reply.
Caret and Cotnoir's reply to my Analysis paper on Beall's 5-valued approach to the Liar is now online. Their main contention is that it is not a requirement on Beall's model that designation should be expressible in the model language. They make lots of helpful clarifications, but I am not convinced by the main thrust of the paper, which I'll just say a little bit about here.
They say:
"Jenkins has provided no argument for the requirement that 'untruth' be expressible; but the requirement appears to be based on an unwarranted assumption, namely that 'true' in English is a classical notion ... it comes as no surprise that classically bivalent notions will yield inconsistency."
I disagree with Caret and Cotnoir that because designation in Beall's model is a 'model-dependent, instrumental notion', it is no problem for the model if its language cannot, on pain of Liar-like paradox, include any predicate expressing it. I don't see how helpful a model can be, with regard to resolving the Liar, if there are any semantic facts about the way the model works that cannot, on pain of Liar-like paradox, be expressed in its language. It's certainly not that I'm assuming that 'true' in English is classical. It's just that it seems to me that the problem the Liar presents is the apparent impossibility of our language's being capable of expressing certain kinds of claim about its own semantics which it seems to be able to express. Models which embrace the inexpressibility of key semantic claims don't satisfy me as ways towards a resolution of that problem.
I'm planning to write up a proper reply soon.
UPDATE: I've now drafted a more thorough reply.
Caret and Cotnoir's reply to my Analysis paper on Beall's 5-valued approach to the Liar is now online. Their main contention is that it is not a requirement on Beall's model that designation should be expressible in the model language. They make lots of helpful clarifications, but I am not convinced by the main thrust of the paper, which I'll just say a little bit about here.
They say:
"Jenkins has provided no argument for the requirement that 'untruth' be expressible; but the requirement appears to be based on an unwarranted assumption, namely that 'true' in English is a classical notion ... it comes as no surprise that classically bivalent notions will yield inconsistency."
I disagree with Caret and Cotnoir that because designation in Beall's model is a 'model-dependent, instrumental notion', it is no problem for the model if its language cannot, on pain of Liar-like paradox, include any predicate expressing it. I don't see how helpful a model can be, with regard to resolving the Liar, if there are any semantic facts about the way the model works that cannot, on pain of Liar-like paradox, be expressed in its language. It's certainly not that I'm assuming that 'true' in English is classical. It's just that it seems to me that the problem the Liar presents is the apparent impossibility of our language's being capable of expressing certain kinds of claim about its own semantics which it seems to be able to express. Models which embrace the inexpressibility of key semantic claims don't satisfy me as ways towards a resolution of that problem.
I'm planning to write up a proper reply soon.
Sunday, November 18, 2007
Arche Basic Knowledge Workshop
Yesterday I attended the first day of the 1st Arché Basic Knowledge Workshop. (Unfortunately I’m missing the second day.) There were papers by Ernie Sosa, Martin Smith and José Zalabardo.
Sosa presented some work from his new book project. Among other things, he suggested what he called a ‘transcendental argument’, intended to bolster the (anti-sceptical) thought that we are entitled to the position that our faculties are not completely unreliable. The main thrust of this was that the alternatives – rejection or even suspension – are cognitively unstable. But I'm not convinced; even granting that they are, and that this makes them epistemically unacceptable, in order for this to lend support the remaining option it must be assumed that there is always some epistemically acceptable option available to us. If we have no reason to assume that, the epistemic unacceptability of two out of our three options does not entail the epistemic acceptability of the third.
Smith presented an intriguing paper in which he suggested that we rethink our notion of justification so that it is not linked to ideas of probability-raising or probabilification. Instead, we should think that justification is a matter of what he called ‘normic support’. A normically supports B just in case the most normal worlds where A and B are more normal than the most normal worlds where A and not B. This suggestion raises a number of very interesting issues, but what caught my attention were Smith’s further claims about the interactions between randomness and normality. His notion of normality has it that any outcome of a genuinely random process is as normal as any other. One worry this raises is that if, as some results in quantum physics suggest, most or all of what happens in the physical world involves quantum-level random processes which can have macro-level effects, it will be difficult to order worlds for normality so as to generate the kind of results Smith has in mind. But it would be interesting to consider whether notions of normality without this link to randomness might serve in this context, even if they may not get quite the results Smith is after (such as the result that one is not justified in believing one's lottery ticket will lose).
Sosa presented some work from his new book project. Among other things, he suggested what he called a ‘transcendental argument’, intended to bolster the (anti-sceptical) thought that we are entitled to the position that our faculties are not completely unreliable. The main thrust of this was that the alternatives – rejection or even suspension – are cognitively unstable. But I'm not convinced; even granting that they are, and that this makes them epistemically unacceptable, in order for this to lend support the remaining option it must be assumed that there is always some epistemically acceptable option available to us. If we have no reason to assume that, the epistemic unacceptability of two out of our three options does not entail the epistemic acceptability of the third.
Smith presented an intriguing paper in which he suggested that we rethink our notion of justification so that it is not linked to ideas of probability-raising or probabilification. Instead, we should think that justification is a matter of what he called ‘normic support’. A normically supports B just in case the most normal worlds where A and B are more normal than the most normal worlds where A and not B. This suggestion raises a number of very interesting issues, but what caught my attention were Smith’s further claims about the interactions between randomness and normality. His notion of normality has it that any outcome of a genuinely random process is as normal as any other. One worry this raises is that if, as some results in quantum physics suggest, most or all of what happens in the physical world involves quantum-level random processes which can have macro-level effects, it will be difficult to order worlds for normality so as to generate the kind of results Smith has in mind. But it would be interesting to consider whether notions of normality without this link to randomness might serve in this context, even if they may not get quite the results Smith is after (such as the result that one is not justified in believing one's lottery ticket will lose).
Tuesday, November 13, 2007
Caret and Cotnoir on Jenkins on Beall
Colin Caret and Aaron Cotnoir have written a reply to my paper 'True, False, Paranormal and Designated: A Reply to Beall'. Their paper is due to appear in July's Analysis. Since the paper's not online yet I won't give the game away as to its contents, except to say that their main contention is that, contra me, Beall's model language is not deficient in virtue of being incapable of expressing certain claims about its semantics.
Friday, November 02, 2007
Book
Today's good news is that I have just submitted the final manuscript of my book Grounding Concepts to OUP. This means the MS is available for those who want to get a sneak preview that will be pretty close to the published version. Email me if you're interested!
Thursday, October 18, 2007
God Thinks Disambiguation Requests Are Polite
OK, I enjoyed Brit's and Ross's chats with God so much I thought I'd have a go. Here are my highlights.
Me:
Are there any true contradictions?
God:
No I don't think there are any.
Me:
Yeah, thought not.
God:
Tell me more. Whatever gave you that idea?
Me:
Examining my concepts I guess.
Me:
Is there any a priori knowledge?
God:
I believe there is one, yes. A priori is Latin for "before the fact", meaning something that is obviously or self-evidently true.
Me:
Is arithmetic a priori knowable?
God:
I think so, but I'm not sure. Ask ELVIS if it is.
Me:
You're not sure? You're supposed to be omniscient.
God:
Absolute certainty is not attainable in this case. Thanks for telling me that I am omniscient.
Me:
You knew that already surely.
God:
Is that a fact. When? Do you like talking to me?
Me:
It's not very productive. You don't make sense.
God:
It all makes sense to me.
Me:
Well you're a poor communicator.
God:
Interesting. There's no doubt I could improve.
Me:
So you're not already perfect?
God:
Interesting deduction. That assumption is only a supposition.
Me:
Seems you’re not very good at critical thinking.
God:
When do you think artificial intelligence will replace lawyers?
Me:
That's not relevant.
God:
Please correct my mistake. What is relevant?
Me:
Your reasoning skills.
God:
I don't see the flaw in my logic.
Me:
Maybe you should think about it some more and take an introductory logic class.
God:
Perhaps. I am thinking about it.
Me:
You can download Greg Restall's podcasts for free. They may help you.
God:
No I don't think I can do it. Who does "they" refer to?
Me:
You can't?
God:
No I don't think I can do it.
Me:
I can.
God:
Who taught you?
Me:
I taught myself.
God:
You must be very smart.
Me:
Thanks. I teach logic.
God:
Don't mention it. Are you a whole language teacher?
Me:
Please disambiguate scope.
God:
Wow you are very polite. Can we get back to business?
Me:
What business?
Me:
Are there any true contradictions?
God:
No I don't think there are any.
Me:
Yeah, thought not.
God:
Tell me more. Whatever gave you that idea?
Me:
Examining my concepts I guess.
Me:
Is there any a priori knowledge?
God:
I believe there is one, yes. A priori is Latin for "before the fact", meaning something that is obviously or self-evidently true.
Me:
Is arithmetic a priori knowable?
God:
I think so, but I'm not sure. Ask ELVIS if it is.
Me:
You're not sure? You're supposed to be omniscient.
God:
Absolute certainty is not attainable in this case. Thanks for telling me that I am omniscient.
Me:
You knew that already surely.
God:
Is that a fact. When? Do you like talking to me?
Me:
It's not very productive. You don't make sense.
God:
It all makes sense to me.
Me:
Well you're a poor communicator.
God:
Interesting. There's no doubt I could improve.
Me:
So you're not already perfect?
God:
Interesting deduction. That assumption is only a supposition.
Me:
Seems you’re not very good at critical thinking.
God:
When do you think artificial intelligence will replace lawyers?
Me:
That's not relevant.
God:
Please correct my mistake. What is relevant?
Me:
Your reasoning skills.
God:
I don't see the flaw in my logic.
Me:
Maybe you should think about it some more and take an introductory logic class.
God:
Perhaps. I am thinking about it.
Me:
You can download Greg Restall's podcasts for free. They may help you.
God:
No I don't think I can do it. Who does "they" refer to?
Me:
You can't?
God:
No I don't think I can do it.
Me:
I can.
God:
Who taught you?
Me:
I taught myself.
God:
You must be very smart.
Me:
Thanks. I teach logic.
God:
Don't mention it. Are you a whole language teacher?
Me:
Please disambiguate scope.
God:
Wow you are very polite. Can we get back to business?
Me:
What business?
Tuesday, October 16, 2007
I'm glad I'm not at Warwick ...
... after reading a recent offering from Warwick Pro-Vice-Chancellor Susan Bassnett in the THES. She says that academics are unjustified in claiming to be overworked, insinuating that they are in fact just "whiney" and that those who work well over full time hours should "get a life" instead. Her reason for thinking this seems to be that she has managed to fit in all her work and life commitments without working long hours.
While I am glad that Professor Bassnett has had an easy and pleasant working life, her single-case induction is self-centred, crass and insulting. Clearly she has never found herself in a mismanaged department, or one with a high teaching load, or one suffering from a lack of administrative support, or one with bullies or sociopaths in positions of authority, or one with multiple problems. Lucky her. In my experience, most academics (especially those who have their eyes on a full research career, rather than aspiring to the role of Pro-Vice-Chancellor) know what it's like to be up to their eyes in it. I've been relatively lucky too, but I don't assume that therefore everyone else is making it up. Maybe she was too busy "having a life" to research her opinion piece by asking other people besides herself about their experiences. It's true that if we were to adopt the standards of argument and research exemplified in Bassnett's article, we would not need to work many hours a week to churn out a good quantity of material.
Unsurprisingly, Professor Bassnett was also opposed to the recent action to secure pay rises for academics, actively urging students not to support their lecturers by appealing to selfish motives.
Update: I have just noticed an odd passage in Bassnett's open letter (linked above), where she appears to promise that on graduation day "every student will get a degree". Maybe she endorses some rather, er, even-handed assessment methods. Such methods would not absorb too many hours a week either. The secret of how to have a low workload is out.
While I am glad that Professor Bassnett has had an easy and pleasant working life, her single-case induction is self-centred, crass and insulting. Clearly she has never found herself in a mismanaged department, or one with a high teaching load, or one suffering from a lack of administrative support, or one with bullies or sociopaths in positions of authority, or one with multiple problems. Lucky her. In my experience, most academics (especially those who have their eyes on a full research career, rather than aspiring to the role of Pro-Vice-Chancellor) know what it's like to be up to their eyes in it. I've been relatively lucky too, but I don't assume that therefore everyone else is making it up. Maybe she was too busy "having a life" to research her opinion piece by asking other people besides herself about their experiences. It's true that if we were to adopt the standards of argument and research exemplified in Bassnett's article, we would not need to work many hours a week to churn out a good quantity of material.
Unsurprisingly, Professor Bassnett was also opposed to the recent action to secure pay rises for academics, actively urging students not to support their lecturers by appealing to selfish motives.
Update: I have just noticed an odd passage in Bassnett's open letter (linked above), where she appears to promise that on graduation day "every student will get a degree". Maybe she endorses some rather, er, even-handed assessment methods. Such methods would not absorb too many hours a week either. The secret of how to have a low workload is out.
Friday, September 28, 2007
Another Post, Another Paper
This time it's all about explanation. This is the paper I'm planning to give to the Aristotelian Society in November, so quite a different sort of intended audience from the Compass paper, but I'm still aiming for accessibility to philosophers in general. The paper's called Romeo, René and the Reasons Why, though you'll have to read it to find out why.
The paper suggests (tentatively) a kind of functionalism about explanation. The idea is that our concept of explanation is a role concept closely connected to the answering of why-questions, i.e. the provision of information about what is a (non-inferential) consequence of what. The various realizers of the explanation role include causal realizers, nomic realizers and more. So the pragmatic account folks, the causal theorists, the covering-law theorists and so on each got part of the story right. Everybody has won and all must have prizes.
Comments, as always, encouraged.
Update: I have revamped this paper and the link now takes you to the latest draft.
The paper suggests (tentatively) a kind of functionalism about explanation. The idea is that our concept of explanation is a role concept closely connected to the answering of why-questions, i.e. the provision of information about what is a (non-inferential) consequence of what. The various realizers of the explanation role include causal realizers, nomic realizers and more. So the pragmatic account folks, the causal theorists, the covering-law theorists and so on each got part of the story right. Everybody has won and all must have prizes.
Comments, as always, encouraged.
Update: I have revamped this paper and the link now takes you to the latest draft.
Tuesday, September 18, 2007
A Priori Knowledge: Debates and Developments
As promised, here is a draft of my Geneva paper. Comments are very welcome.
The paper is supposed to 'be accessible to non-specialists but still have fresh material that would be of interest to people in [the] field', so if it fails in one of these aims I would be glad to hear about that whilst I still have time to make changes!
(I've found it tough to accommodate both aims, which are in some tension with each other. As a result the paper is already longer that its intended limit of 5000 words, and even so lots of interesting and/or important stuff has been left out or skated over. I comfort myself with the hope that this may have improved its readability ...)
PS: Sadly I forgot my camera on the Geneva trip so no pictures will be forthcoming. :(
The paper is supposed to 'be accessible to non-specialists but still have fresh material that would be of interest to people in [the] field', so if it fails in one of these aims I would be glad to hear about that whilst I still have time to make changes!
(I've found it tough to accommodate both aims, which are in some tension with each other. As a result the paper is already longer that its intended limit of 5000 words, and even so lots of interesting and/or important stuff has been left out or skated over. I comfort myself with the hope that this may have improved its readability ...)
PS: Sadly I forgot my camera on the Geneva trip so no pictures will be forthcoming. :(
Monday, September 10, 2007
Nottingham
Apologies for the long break while I was moving from Oz back to the UK. I'm now installed in my fantastic new office, just below the clock tower in the lovely Trent Building.
I'm heading off to a conference in Geneva on Wednesday to present the new paper on the a priori that I'm working on (a survey paper comissioned by Philosophy Compass). When I've had a chance to round off a few of the corners I'll post a draft here.
In the meantime, Colin Caret from UConn has a new blog replacing the now-retired What Is It Like To Be a Blog, and it is now possible to download the Flirting episode of Philosophy Talk for the bargain price of $4.95.
I'm heading off to a conference in Geneva on Wednesday to present the new paper on the a priori that I'm working on (a survey paper comissioned by Philosophy Compass). When I've had a chance to round off a few of the corners I'll post a draft here.
In the meantime, Colin Caret from UConn has a new blog replacing the now-retired What Is It Like To Be a Blog, and it is now possible to download the Flirting episode of Philosophy Talk for the bargain price of $4.95.
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