I'm posting the nearly-final draft of my paper on Boghossian on Epistemic Analyticity. Comments welcome. The paper upholds the objection that knowledge of meaning through implicit definition cannot be a source of a priori knowledge, since in order to use implicit definitions, one must already know the propositions knowledge of which we are trying to account for. This claim itself is not new, but I aim to do four new things: firstly, drawing on some recent work by my former colleague Philip Ebert, I put a new structure on the objection, showing how it works on either of two possible readings of one of Boghossian's premises. Secondly, I argue that Boghossian's recent attempts to answer this sort of objection are unsuccessful. Thirdly, I offer some new side-objections to Boghossian. Finally, I resist Ebert's reasons for thinking what's wrong with Boghossian's argument is that it fails to transmit warrant (and also explain how the objection I defend is different).
Update: The link now points to a new draft, changes to which have been based in part on the discussion in the comments on this post.