Here's a common claim schema:
If ... is dependent on our language, then were our language to be different in relevant respects then so would ... be.
(1) If vagueness depends on our language, then were all semantic vagueness to be eliminated then there would be no vagueness.
A worry about this is that it seems a semantic theorist of vagueness (someone who thinks vagueness is entirely due to semantic features of our language, and has nothing to do with how the world is independently of our linguistic representations of it) might sensibly reject (1), and instead assert:
(2) Although vagueness depends on our language, if all semantic vagueness were eliminated, this apple would still be borderline red.
For the consequent of the counterfactual is couched in the very language which is supposed to be suitable for creating vagueness. Asserting (2) therefore does nothing to undermine the thought that it is the semantic features of our actual word 'red' language which are responsible for the borderlineness, in other worlds, of the apple's redness.
What do people think?