tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-14526046.post6166826669883333801..comments2023-10-30T08:54:07.935+00:00Comments on Long Words Bother Me: Epistemic Norms and Natural FactsCarrie Jenkinshttp://www.blogger.com/profile/01023567638433203715noreply@blogger.comBlogger4125tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-14526046.post-72869886871496735102009-11-14T01:08:24.086+00:002009-11-14T01:08:24.086+00:00Who knows where to download XRumer 5.0 Palladium? ...Who knows where to download XRumer 5.0 Palladium? <br />Help, please. All recommend this program to effectively advertise on the Internet, this is the best program!Anonymousnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-14526046.post-86516051781192392432007-05-10T21:01:00.000+01:002007-05-10T21:01:00.000+01:00Carrie--I just sent an e-mail message to your ANU ...Carrie--I just sent an e-mail message to your ANU account. I'm trying to contact you about this article, "Epistemic Norms and Natural Facts," so please look for my e-mail. Thanks! Greg Swope, gswope@pdcnet.orgAnonymousnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-14526046.post-68932222960427151592007-04-05T19:51:00.000+01:002007-04-05T19:51:00.000+01:00Metaphysical realism--even of the Fregean sort--is...Metaphysical realism--even of the Fregean sort--is merely an assumption. And doing some insta-Hume, nominalism certainly is as plausible an inference about ontology as is Realism. And that is not merely "philosophy" but concerns the precious foundationalism. Carnap--and physics as first philosophy--trumps the Fregean ghost..............But empiricism, from Hobbes to Carnap, has nevered played well in the analytical philosophy bidness.Anonymousnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-14526046.post-35347421372935287982007-04-02T17:43:00.000+01:002007-04-02T17:43:00.000+01:00"E1: S epistemically ought to believe p are made..."E1: S epistemically ought to believe p <BR/>are made true by the same states of affairs as claims of the form:<BR/>P3: p is probably true, in an obvious and salient way, given S’s state of information."<BR/>I take it this is the central claim. (I think the paper is great by the way) <BR/>I agree with the claim, though am worried that a "no oughts in nature" die hard would claim that P3 is no less epistemically normative than E1. But perhaps this is only because I do agree with the claim. My hope is that probability statements are best interpreted as normative statements about practical decisions. Then maximising utility becomes not an analogy, but the very same principle underlying epistemic norms.<BR/>Given S has E, S should believe X,<BR/>is bi conditionally related to:<BR/>prob X\E = n, where n is high enough for "probably x" to be true in context. "prob x = n" then can be interpreted subjectively, meaning that given that evidence, one should act in certain ways depending on expected utility. This is in effect a reduction of epistemic ought to instrumental ought.bloggin the Questionhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/05991456353878889126noreply@blogger.com