tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-14526046.post112238298253082903..comments2023-10-30T08:54:07.935+00:00Comments on Long Words Bother Me: Vague ExistenceCarrie Jenkinshttp://www.blogger.com/profile/01023567638433203715noreply@blogger.comBlogger4125tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-14526046.post-1122845033197928772005-07-31T22:23:00.000+01:002005-07-31T22:23:00.000+01:00"if the best theory says their existence is vague ..."if the best theory says their existence is vague then it quantifies over them, and so is (vaguely?) committed to them after all. And that was your point."<BR/><BR/>That's not quite how I was seeing it - my point was that if the best theory says their existence is vague then it <I>isn't</I> committed to them, but since the theory is committed to them iff they are among the range of the theory's quantifiers, this means they are not among the range of the theory's quantifiers. So the best theory can truly say that nothing is one of them. But that's weird, given that the theory was supposed to be saying that it's vague whether or not they exist ...Carrie Jenkinshttps://www.blogger.com/profile/01023567638433203715noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-14526046.post-1122478486064518962005-07-27T16:34:00.000+01:002005-07-27T16:34:00.000+01:00Ok, and if the best theory says their existence is...Ok, and if the best theory says their existence is vague then it quantifies over them, and so is (vaguely?) committed to them after all. And that was your point.<BR/><BR/>So I suppose my first point does rely on my further point: Quineans can accept ontic vagueness iff they deny that it's worldly.Anonymousnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-14526046.post-1122454135120808302005-07-27T09:48:00.000+01:002005-07-27T09:48:00.000+01:00If their existence is vague, surely the best theor...If their existence is vague, surely the best theory is one which says their existence is vague, and therefore one which isn't committed to them?<BR/><BR/>On the further point - my idea was just to explore worldly vagueness (for now!).Carrie Jenkinshttps://www.blogger.com/profile/01023567638433203715noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-14526046.post-1122406204511443642005-07-26T20:30:00.000+01:002005-07-26T20:30:00.000+01:00Not that I have much truck for either Quineanism o...Not that I have much truck for either Quineanism or vague existence, but I think there's a way out of this difficulty. You're worried about whether the Quinean can say that 'it's a vague matter whether we're committed to one or not'. But clearly the Quinean *can* say that it's a vague matter whether we *should* be committed to one or not, and that's all they need. As I understand the Quineans, they think that what exists isn't what our current theory commits us to, but what our best theory commits us to. So Quineans who admit that we don't have the best theory yet can say that we aren't committed to some vaguely existing objects, because what's vague is whether the best theory commits us to them, not whether current theory so commits us.<BR/><BR/>Further related point: perhaps Quineans can say that vague existence stems from vagueness in 'best theory'. So maybe ontic vagueness can still be linguistic rather than worldly.Anonymousnoreply@blogger.com