Opacity and Anti-Realism

Something I probably should have thought about before, but in fact only noticed in conversation with Daniel Stoljar on Friday, is that (by my lights) '... is an anti-realist about ...' can create opaque contexts, on at least some uses. I reckon that one way to to be an anti-realist about ethics is to say that the ethical facts are identical with certain facts about what we approve and disapprove of. But anti-realists about ethics needn't (even by their own lights - i.e. even given that their identity claim is right) be anti-realists about approval.

In Australia

Greetings from the ANU! Pending recovery from jetlag, I've been enjoying meeting the philosophers and other local wildlife, and listening to an interesting talk by Hilary Greaves on how in the multiverse we should rationally update our beliefs.

Epistemic Norms Paper

Things will be quieter here for a while during the run-up to my move to Canberra at the end of August.

In the meantime, here is the current rough draft of my paper on Epistemic Normativity. Comments very welcome, although I can't promise to reply quickly at the moment :(